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0The shipping transport industry plays a very important role in the country’s
development. Considering the archipelagic setting of the country, shipping
provides the primary means of interisland transport. That is, the bulk of
domestic trade is transported by shipping; interisland travel, especially in
the southern part of the country, is also largely dependent on shipping.
Considering this role, an efficient shipping industry that facilitates the
movement of commodities, products and people is vital to the growth of the
country. This is one where passengers and cargoes get to their destinations
on time and in good and safe condition at the least possible cost. For cargoes,
especially agricultural commodities, the transport should be in a manner
where their physical condition at their place of destination allows them to be
marketed at the most competitive price.
The country’s domestic shipping industry, however, has been regarded
as inefficient.  This is rather unfortunate as the industry has a large number
of shipping companies where competition could be expected to be a powerful
force for eliminating inefficiency. Past studies suggest the underlying
explanation has much to do with government regulations and policies affecting
the industry.
The industry had been highly regulated until policy reforms were
instituted in the 1990s in response to the continuing inefficiency. This study
examines the inefficiency of the industry in terms of the complex interaction
between regulation and competition; and then analyzes the effects of the
policy reforms on competition and market structure. The scope of the paper
is limited to the interisland liner shipping industry because this is the sector
where regulation is highly concentrated and whose viability is highly sensitive
to government policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief profile of
the industry. Section 3 discusses the contestability of markets in the shipping
industry, including the arguments for and against regulating the industry.
Section 4 examines the regulatory framework and policies prior to the
implementation of the policy reforms. This is followed by a discussion of the





Section 6 is an analysis of the effects of the reforms on market structure and
competition, including the impact of competition on efficiency.  Section 7 is a
discussion of the role of the MARINA in a deregulated environment.  Areas
for competition policy and further reforms are then identified in Section 8.
The summary and conclusions are presented in Section 9.
Philippine Domestic Shipping Transport IndustryMarine or shipping transport services consist of three types of activities
namely, maritime transport services, maritime auxiliary services and port
services (Fink, Mattoo and Neagu, 2000). Marine transport refers to the actual
transportation service performed once the commodity or passenger is on
board a ship until the ship reaches its port of destination. Marine auxiliary
services refer to activities related to cargo manipulation in ports and on ships.
Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) classification,
these include cargo handling, storage and warehousing, custom clearance,
container station and depot, maritime agency and freight forwarding. On
the other hand, port services refer to those activities related solely to ship
management in ports. Under GATS classification, these include pilotage,
towing and tug assistance, provisioning, fuelling and watering, garbage
collecting and disposal, port captain’s services, navigation aids, shore-based
operational services and emergency repair facilities. This paper will
concentrate on marine transport, as the other two types of activities have
separate issues of their own.
The country’s domestic marine or shipping transport is composed of
three sectors: liner, tramp and industrial carriage. Liner shipping refers to the
operation of domestic water transportation that offers their services to the
public without discrimination to any user, have regular ports of call and
have fixed sailing schedules and frequency. Tramp shipping, on the other
hand, refers to the operation of freight vessels that are not plying a regular
route but are hired on a contractual basis by shippers under mutually agreed
terms and usually carry cargoes of bulky commodities. Industrial carriage
refers to the shipping operations of companies arising from the necessity to
cater to the needs of their own enterprises. Of the three sectors, only liner
shipping is regulated by the government.
The shipping transport industry contributes about half a percent to the
country’s gross domestic product and this share has remained unchanged




Domestic Shipping Transport Industry:
Brief Profileincreased from almost 30 million in 1990 to 44.4 million in 2000, registering a
4.05 percent average annual growth rate during the period (Table 2). The
volume of domestic cargo carried also went up from 58 million metric tons
in 1990 to 76.9 million metric tons in 2000 or a growth rate of almost 2.87
percent per year.
The domestic shipping industry also plays an important role in the
country’s international trade by carrying, between ports in the country,
cargoes intended for exports and cargoes arriving as imports, or what are
referred to as transit cargoes. Between 1991 and 1998, transit cargoes grew
from 597.5 thousand metric tons to 757.3 thousand metric tons or by 2.67
percent per annum (Table 2).
The domestic shipping fleet is dominated by general cargo in terms of
gross registered tonnage (GRT) (Figure 1). Starting 1993, the domestic fleet,
particularly passenger cargo and general cargo, registered a big increase in
tonnage such that the capacity of the industry was growing much faster than
the passenger and cargo traffic generated (Table 3). Also very striking was
the large drop in the average age of the passenger cargo fleet (Table 4). As
will be discussed in Section 6 of the paper, all these changes have much to do
with the liberalization and deregulation measures instituted in the industry
in the 1990s.
Liner shipping routes are classified as primary, secondary, tertiary and
developmental routes. The classification is based on ports being served, popu-
lation and economic development in the area, and the cargo/passenger
4
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Table 1. Gross value added in water transport (million pesos at constant 1985 prices)


































Sources: 1999 NSO Phil. Statistical Yearbook; National Income Accounts of the PhilippinesDomestic Shipping Transport Industry: Brief Profile
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Notes:
(1) The 1996 inventory does not include vessels with sizes 3 GT and below such that the resulting
figures turned out to be smaller than the 1995 figures, thereby rendering the statistics non-comparable
for purposes of trend determination.
(2) “Others” include liquid cargo/ lighterage, barging, tanker, towing, salvaging, pleasure, pilotage, and
others with no information.
Source: MARINA Domestic Fleet Inventory
Figure 1. Total GRT of domestic merchant fleet, type of service, 1990-1999




















































Average annual growth rate (%)
Notes: (1) NA means not available (1990 domestic cargo data includes both domestic and transit cargo)
(2) Average growth rate for transit cargo from 1991-2000
Source: NSO Philippine Statistical Yearbook6
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throughput attendant to the linkages fostered. Primary routes include those
that handle domestic volume of national significance and usually cover the
major ports of the country. Secondary routes include those that handle do-
mestic volume of regional significance and are linked to ports of lesser through-
puts than major ports. Tertiary routes are feeder routes that handle cargoes
consolidated and destined for primary and secondary ports. Finally, devel-
Table 3. Annual growth rate of traffic and capacity (%)
Year
Passenger  Cargo









































Notes: Data for 1996 not included. Capacity is based on passenger cargo GRT for passenger and general cargo plus
container GRT for cargo.
Sources: MARINA (for GRT); Philippine Statistical Yearbook (passenger traffic)
Table 4. Average age of domestic merchant fleet, by type of service, 1990-1999



















































(1) The 1996 inventory  does not include vessels with sizes 3 GT and below such that the resulting figures turned out
to be smaller than the 1995 figures, thereby rendering the statistics non-comparable for purposes of trend determination.
(2) No data available for 1993.
Source: MARINA Domestic Fleet InventoryDomestic Shipping Transport Industry: Brief Profile
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opmental routes do not have existing shipping operators but shipping opera-
tions are economically desirable because of their potentials in agriculture,




in the Shipping Industry
The literature on contestability of markets points to the importance of the
threat of competition, as distinct from actual competition, in enforcing good
behavior and conduct among firms in the industry (Hanlon 1996). This kind
of market is characterized by the following:  (i) there are no barriers to entry,
that is, no extra cost borne by new entrants that are not borne by the incum-
bents; (ii) there are no sunk costs, that is costs that cannot be recouped when
a firm withdraws from the industry; (iii) the time for the incumbents to change
their price in response to the entry is longer than the time for the new entrant to
make profits. According to this theory, firms in oligopolistic industries will
still price at the same level as they would in a perfectly competitive market so
long as the threat of competition exists. In other words, under this market, the
incumbents can protect themselves from new competition only by behaving well.
A contestable market offers to consumers and the society similar benefits
from a perfectly competitive market (Baumol and Lee 1991). Because of the
threat of competition, firms cannot charge higher-than-competitive prices or
earn excessive profits; any attempt to do so would invite new entrants to
undercut the incumbents’ prices to a level that could still give them attractive
returns. Waste and inefficiency beyond that which is allowed by the current
of state of technology and level of knowledge are also avoided as these would
be reflected in higher costs and prices, the presence of which would invite
the entry of efficient firms. Likewise, predatory pricing and cross-subsidy
pricing are prevented. Predation becomes unattractive since it can only be
done if there is a prospect for making future profits large enough to recoup
losses made when prices or profits were kept low to drive competitors or
new entrants away; but then excessive profits would invite entry. Cross-subsidy
occurs when a firm charges a price below cost to a particular group of custom-
ers and the loss is made up for by charging excessive prices to other customers.
This is not feasible under a contestable market as the excessive price would
invite new entrants who can sell at a lower price level. In effect, the new
entrants are capturing from the incumbents the earnings that were previously
used for cross-subsidy.
8Arguments for and against regulating the shipping industry
The shipping industry is a highly contestable market in the absence of gov-
ernment regulations that prevent market forces take their course on the func-
tioning of the industry. The common argument for the need to regulate liner
shipping is based on the supposed danger of chronic instability due to inher-
ent tendencies toward ruinous competition and monopoly (Renardet Sauti
Consulting Engineers 1986). That is, the industry is highly vulnerable to price
and capacity fluctuations that lead to ruinous competition and eventually to
monopoly, after the weak firms are driven out.
Price instability
The vulnerability to price and capacity fluctuations, if there are no limits to
competition, is argued to be associated with the cost structure of the indus-
try. Once a vessel is at berth, the only cost associated with carrying an extra
ton of cargo is the cost of loading and discharging it; and such marginal cost
is very low, an average of about 25-30 percent of the freight rate. At such
rate, an operator cannot survive. Hence, an operator will find it profitable to
take an extra cargo at a rate higher than the handling cost. However, if there
is free competition, the rate would be forced to go down to the level of the
handling cost whenever there is any surplus in capacity. The industry will
then become unprofitable for all operators.
However, it is also argued that the above argument is not plausible as
shipping operators do not in practice cut their rates to the level of marginal
costs once the ship is at berth. Instead, what influences the behavior of op-
erators is not the marginal cost of an extra ton of cargo, but the cost of an
extra voyage or set of voyages and their relation to revenues at pre-deter-
mined rate levels.
Nevertheless, pricecutting is practiced but only in so far as there is over-
capacity or overtonnaging in the industry.  And this can lead to rate instability.
Monopoly
Another argument for government regulation is the danger of monopoly. A
natural monopoly occurs when there are economies of scale that allows a
large company to charge lower prices because its unit costs are lower than a
small company. This will eventually drive small firms from the market. In
shipping, the lower unit costs may arise from larger ships or from a larger
number of ships.
It is also argued, however, that there are no significant economies of
scale in the shipping industry (Renardet Sauti Consulting Engineers 1986) or
that economies of scale is not a significant barrier to entry in the industry
9
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(Dick 1987). While a larger vessel will generally give lower costs per ton than
a small ship, the cost advantage of larger vessels is offset by two factors.
One, cargo handling rates increase less than proportionately with ship size,
so that the larger ship tends to spend a larger proportion of its time in port.
Two, smaller ships are able to provide more frequent service because of their
faster turnaround. Hence, small ships can operate alongside with larger ships.
On the number of ships, a large fleet will not necessarily have lower
costs per ton than a small fleet. More than 80 percent of a shipping company’s
operating costs are ship operating costs, the rest being terminal and adminis-
trative costs. Thus, if a company increases its fleet by 20 percent, its operat-
ing cost is expected to increase by the same amount (Renardet Sauti Consult-
ing Engineers 1986).
Furthermore, economies of size appear to be insignificant beyond about
three ships, while diseconomies seem to occur beyond about 10 ships (Dick
1987). This is attributed to managerial diseconomies of scale. Shipping com-
panies are said to be difficult to manage because the locations of the head
office, branch office and terminals are so dispersed. Profitability is highly
dependent on capacity utilization, which in turn depends on port turnaround.
This would then require some kind of loyalty to the shipping company of
officers and crew to cooperate in speeding up turnaround. As a general rule,
however, officers and crew would prefer a longer to a shorter stay in port.
Hence, to increase turnaround and productivity, some kind of incentive and
a good wage structure is required. In family shipping businesses, the practice
is to appoint family members to man the day-to-day operations of the busi-
ness across various ports. However, as the number of ships, routes and ports
increases, the problem of control and management seems to increase dispro-
portionately.
Competition in shipping
Rate discounting, particularly on freight rates, is a common practice in the
industry. Even when there are government regulations on rate setting, the
official rates become just a benchmark or a base from which to discount.
Actual freight rates are usually the product of bargaining between shippers
and shipping operators (Dick 1987). Discount comes in various forms like
underrecording the weight or volume of the cargo or declaring the cargo as
a low-value item.  Since such practices do not involve a reduction in freight
rate as reflected in the bill of lading, shipping companies can make it appear
that they are following the official rates.
Discounting drives up price competition in the industry. To lessen the
pressure for rate discounts, shipping companies with established financial
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position offer longer terms for payment. But on the other hand, forwarders,
traders and large companies that distribute their own products can make
bargains for large discounts by offering a contract for their cargoes for a
fixed period. Guaranteed by the security of a contract and a large volume of
cargoes, a shipping company can thus settle for a low margin for its shipping
rates.
The disadvantage of competing through rate discounting, however, is
that any discount can readily be matched by competitors. Thus, in the face of
intense rate competition, the best strategy for a shipping company is to try
and become the market leader in terms of quality of service. In practice,
freight rates are not the primary but the balancing item in the services nego-
tiated with shippers, as shippers and traders are more concerned with the
safety of their cargoes. That is, the cost of a late or damaged cargo could be
much more than the savings from a small discount in freight rate.
Thus, competition in shipping is primarily in terms of quality of service.
A good reputation for reliable service can insulate shipping companies from
intense competition in freight rates and can allow them to charge a premium
rate and earn a more than normal profit. But such cannot last long as the
premium invites other companies to improve on the quality of their service.
However, in times of excess capacity when rate cutting is prevalent, compa-
nies with good reputation are able to keep their share of the market while
companies offering not so reliable service destroy each other in a fight for
the crumbs. In practice, rate cutting is prevalent only among firms at the
lower end of the market offering the poorest service and struggling to survive.
Contestability of Markets in the Shipping Industry12
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Regulatory Framework and Policies:
Prereform Period
Regulation of the domestic liner shipping industry was first introduced in
the country during the American colonial rule. In fact, the pattern of the
early regulations closely resembled those that applied to American railroads
and motor trucking industry. The then Board of Transportation (BOT) was
in charge of regulating the industry until the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA) took over the function in 1985. Regulation covers route entry and
rate/tariff determination.
Liner rate regulations
Regulations for liner rates began in 1928. The objective was to protect the
public from indiscriminate charging by shipping companies and, at the same
time, protect the investment of liner operators by preventing ruinous compe-
tition.  Rates, or what are commonly called as tariffs, were fixed by the gov-
ernment. To simplify the task of setting rates for a large number of com-
modities or passengers, rates were structured by commodity or passenger
class. Commodities were initially classified as Class A for processed goods
or high value manufactured goods, Class B for semiprocessed goods or low
value manufactured goods, Class C for unprocessed commodities and Basic
for rice, palay, corn, corngrits, fruits, vegetables and livestocks. As will be
discussed later, some of the Basic commodities were reclassified when policy
reforms were introduced into the industry. Passenger services, on the other
hand, were classified as First Class, Second Class and Third Class depending
on the kind of services and accommodation offered. Starting in 1983, the
tariff structure for both passenger and cargo provided different rates with
respect to three distance ranges namely, 0-100 miles, 101-300 miles and over
300 miles.
The tariff structure prescribes a set of formulae for user charges that
vary in accordance with the commodity classification or service class of pas-
sengers and the direct distance between the ports of origin and destination.13
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The formula for cargo rates has a fixed and distance-related component while
the passage rate only has a distance-related component. The fixed compo-
nent reflects the cost of the vessel while loading or discharging in port and it
is computed in pesos revenue per ton. On the other hand, the variable or
distance-related component reflects the cost of the vessel's time while at sea
and is computed in pesos per revenue ton mile or pesos per passenger mile.
A revenue ton is either a measurement ton of one cubic meter, or a weight
ton of 1000 kilograms, whichever gives the higher revenue to the shipping
operator.
The first rate formulae instituted in 1928 were originally cost-based,
with a uniform tariff per nautical mile for most cargoes. Cost-based tariff is
one which passes on the costs of providing the service to shippers without
discriminating between cargoes. By the 1980s, however, the rates were both
cost- and value-based in that while the fixed and variable components were
retained, high-value goods had higher rates than low-value goods. Such prac-
tice allows the cross-subsidization of the shipment of low-value goods.
For cargo rates, there was an alternative to the class rates. The liner
operators had the option to charge an ad valorem rate on any goods valued
at over P1,000 per ton. The original objective was to limit the ad valorem rates
only on very high value goods, but with the passage of time and as inflation
increases the prices of all commodities, the ad valorem option became appli-
cable to more and more commodities. The rate was 0.5 percent in 1928 and at
that time, it excluded almost all goods in the interisland trade. By the 1980s,
however, the threshold included most commodities.
Throughout the period 1928-1985, the basic structure of tariffs remained
largely unchanged (Renardet Sauti Consulting Engineers 1986). Only the level
of rates changed by periodic across-the-board increases, basically to reflect
changes in inflation rate. For the ad valorem rate, the rate is increased by the
square of the inflation rate. The rate first increases automatically as the price
of the cargo increases and then a second time with the official increase in the
ad valorem percentage rate. From 0.5 percent in 1928, the rate had risen to
7.3 percent by 1989.  In the 1980s, the ad valorem rate became so high that it
represented serious deviations from appropriate charges based on shipping
costs (PTF 1989).
For the class rates (passage and freights rates), upward adjustments
were made using the revenue deficiency method. Under this method, rate
adjustments are made based on the revenues that need to be generated by
liner operators to provide a rate of return (ROI) consistent with Common-wealth Act No.146 or the Public Service Act of 1936. The Act declared the
provision of shipping services, along with other services1, as a public service.
The maximum allowable ROI for public utilities was 12 percent and it has
remained at this level until today. Under the revenue deficiency method, the
required revenue is compared to the actual revenue (based on audited finan-
cial statements provided by the ship operators), and the difference indicated
the deficiency in rates.
The method is too dependent on the financial reports of shipping op-
erators.  Before the reforms were instituted, MARINA combined the finan-
cial statements of all members of the Domestic Shipping Association (DSA) to
get the average for the industry from which to base the increase and then
apply an across-the-board rate increase. The method does not consider aver-
age load factors and degree of efficiency of operations such that even if load
factors are low and vessel operation is inefficient, rate increases were ap-
proved so long as revenue was insufficient to obtain the prescribed ROI.
Thus, even inefficient firms, which would normally be driven out of the in-
dustry if market forces are allowed to operate, were made to earn profits.
Since the method guarantees operators of profits regardless of their perfor-
mance, there is no pressure on the part of shipowners to search for more
efficient means of meeting the country’s demand for shipping services
(Balisacan 1989). Worse, the method has made the level of shipping rates too
high over the years.  It resulted in rates that did not consider the actual cost
of providing cargo or passenger services.
While the government fixed the rates, enforcement was weak or mini-
mal. Because the rates were too high (both ad valorem and class rates) and
the enforcement was weak, discounting became the rule.  A discount of 15-25
percent was common in the 1980s (Nathan Associates 1991).
At the same time, however, the freight rates for Basic commodities and
the passage rates, particularly for the Third Class, were not permitted to
increase as rapidly as the general inflation rate, for social reasons.
Route licensing
Originally, the shipping industry was exempted from government regulation
under the Public Service Act of requiring operators of all public service to
obtain a certificate of public convenience (CPC) (Chapter II, Section (13a) of
Philippine Domestic Shipping Transport Industry
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1 Also included as public service are any common carrier, railroad, street railway, subway or motor vehicle engaged
in the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine railways, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration
plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, water supply and power, petroleum, sewerage system, wire or
wireless communication system, broadcasting stations and other similar public service.Regulatory Framework and Policies: Prereform Period
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the Act). A CPC is an authorization to operate  a public service; and in this
case, the authorization to a vessel for domestic water transportation services
for commercial use. Route licensing, however, was introduced in 1972. The
commonly accepted reason for its introduction was that the major routes
were overtonnaged while many of the other routes were inadequately served
or had no service (Nathan Associates 1991). The objective therefore of regu-
lating entry was to bring capacity and demand into balance.
For a CPC to be granted, the following requisites must be complied
with:
· The applicant must be a citizen of the Philippines, or a corporation or
a co-partnership, association or joint-stock company constituted and
organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least 60 percent of the
stock or paid-up capital belongs entirely to Philippine citizens;
· The applicant must be financially capable of undertaking the proposed
shipping service and of meeting the responsibilities incident to its
operation; and,
· The applicant must prove that the operations of the public service
proposed and authorized to do business will promote the public
interests in a proper and suitable manner.
CPCs are given on a vessel-to-vessel basis, specifying the exact route
and schedule. There was a deliberate policy, throughout the pre-reform pe-
riod, of limiting competition by restricting market entry. The general prin-
ciples for issuing a CPC were prior-operator, prior-applicant and protection
of investment or what are commonly referred to as "grandfather rules." The
prior applicant rule means that priority is given to the first applicant, among
the various applicants, for a CPC. Prior operator rule means the priority is
given to an existing authorized2 operator in a route, and in each segment of
the route, by virtue of a CPC or provisional authority (PA) issued. On the
other hand, protection of investment rule means the protection and conser-
vation of investment that have already been made by operators.
Following are the two types of application for a license:
· An application for a route for which the applicant/operator has no
franchise, i.e. new entrant in a route.
If the route being applied for is already serviced by a franchised3
operator, the BOT/MARINA conducts a market evaluation upon re-
ceipt of an application for the route to see if the entry of additional
2 An authorized operator is one who has been issued either a certificate of public convenience (CPC) or provisional
authority (PA).
3 A franchised operator is one that has been issued a certificate of public convenience (CPC).operators in the route is justifiable. If the demand warrants addi-
tional fleet, the application is not immediately approved. The existing
operator is first given the priority to put in additional vessel/s to
meet the demand; only when he cannot meet the demand within six
months will the application of a new operator is approved.
However, if the route is already served by nonfranchised opera-
tors, the "prior applicant rule" applies.
For a development route, entry is allowed and the new entrant is
protected in his investment by not allowing another operator to ply
the same route until such time that he has recovered his investment.
Since there was no limit in the number of years by which the operator
is protected to recoup his investment, there was no incentive for him
to make his operation efficient. On the other hand, if market condi-
tions warranted additional tonnage, entry was open to additional
operator/s, but subject to the "prior operator rule." That is, priority
was given to the original operator to put in the additional tonnage.
· An application to expand capacity in a route for which the operator
already has a franchise.
If the demand called for additional capacity, a franchised opera-
tor was allowed to increase 50 percent to his capacity, at minimum
interval of three years. If there were several existing franchised
operators in the same route, the "prior-applicant rule" applied.
However, in all the above rules, the past service records of the
operator/s or the new applicant/s were not taken into consideration.
During the early years of franchising, compliance was low.  Some liners
did not register and those that did were issued CPCs that did not specify
their routes (1986 study). In 1977, a freezing program was introduced in the
industry through Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 11 with the aim to control
overtonnaging in the industry. Under the program, all operators were sup-
posed to secure provisional authority to operate. But there was confusion in
the administration of franchising. Prior to assuming the full responsibility of
handling franchising, MARINA served as the technical arm of the BOT. But
since MARINA and BOT issued approvals independently of each other, the
program did not improve the capability of the government to control and
monitor capacity.
In 1978, MC No. 16 was issued declaring a policy to protect established
shipping companies already providing adequate service from undue compe-
tition. Under the policy, no new operator was allowed to enter primary and
secondary routes and only one operator was allowed for the tertiary route.
Where there was more than one existing operator in a tertiary route, merger
16
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or joint services was promoted or encouraged. MC No. 26, issued in 1982,
introduced the rationalization of the interisland shipping operations.  Among
other things, the circular required all operators (i) to observe their autho-
rized routes, sailing frequency and schedules, and that any deviation from
such without appropriate authority shall be penalized;  (ii) not to abandon,
withdraw or suspend  service without authority from the BOT; and (iii) not
to reroute vessels and doing so was illegal if pursued without an amendment
of the CPC. Under the circular, too, acquisition of new vessels was regulated,
limiting it only to the modernization of tonnage in the route and giving pri-
ority to existing operators. 4
Impact of and problems arising from government regulations
The past regulations of the domestic shipping industry had adverse im-
pact on the economy. This is well documented in the findings of several
studies and is summarized in this section. These documents include the
Interisland Shipping Regulation Study prepared by the Renardet Sauti
Consulting Engineers in 1986; findings of the Presidential Task Force (PTF)
on Interisland Shipping Industry in 1989; the Philippine Transport Sector
Review in 1990; and the studies prepared by Nathan Associates, Inc., the
Interisland Liner Shipping Rate Rationalization Study in 1991 and the Liner
Shipping Route Study in 1994.
Overtonnaging
As discussed earlier, regulating the routes was meant to reduce
overtonnaging of the industry. Over the years, however, onvertonnaging
has persisted. This was manifested in low load factors in most cases. In
short, route franchising did not succeed in bringing capacity and demand
on balance although it moderately succeeded in limiting overtonnaging in
individual routes.
Several factors contributed to the persistent overtonnaging. Route fran-
chising can only deal with the distribution of capacity between routes but not on
the absolute level of capacity of the industry. That is, if a vessel was refused
entry in one route, it could find its way in another route; or if it was with-
drawn from a particular route, it was only rerouted to another route. Hence,
the overall capacity of the industry was maintained or even increased if the
4 Acquisition of new vessels is allowed if it can be proven that there is general deterioration of services in terms of quality and
reliability. All existing operators are given equal opportunity and advance notice on the need to modernize; and if no
application is received within six months, application from new entrants are entertained on a first come, first served
basis.
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vessel involved was new. The origin of overtonnaging is at the vessel import
approval stage. In the past, refusal of import approvals rarely happened.
The 12 percent cap on the return on investment is also said to have
contributed to the overtonnaging of the industry. One practice in the industry
to circumvent the cap is for shipping operators to horizontally expand by
acquiring more vessels thereby increasing their assets, which in turn, form
part in the computation of the required revenue to obtain the ROI. Such
practice does not promote efficiency where the use of vessels is maximized
at the least cost. Additional vessels and tonnage should be dictated by an
increase in demand and not by the desire to meet the prescribed ROI.
The high rates arising from the revenue deficiency method also caused
the overcapacity in the industry. The high rates were sufficient to guarantee
profits even at low load factors.
Flaws in the tariff structure
The tariff structure established in 1928 suffered from major flaws. First, the
rate differentials between classes did not reflect differences in the cost of
providing services for each commodity group but instead it was an attempt
by the government to incorporate consideration of "what the market will
bear" into the regulation process. The product value was generally supposed
to indicate what the market would bear as a proxy for price elasticity of
demand for the product. As discussed below, this resulted to the discrimi-
nation of some commodities and particular routes in the provision of ship-
ping services.
Second, the commodity classification was also problematic as rates for
some commodities were set too low thus, failing to ensure the availability of
sufficient services at all times. This was true, in particular, for the Basic
commodities. At the same time, rates for other commodities were set too
high to permit them to bear the charges.
Third, the application of a uniform rate formula for all routes was
inappropriate as it did not consider both cargo inflow imbalances and cargo
mixes.  The unit cost per ton of cargo increases as capacity utilization falls.
High capacity utilization rate cannot be achieved if there are large imbal-
ances in the inbound and outbound traffic. Hence, rates for routes with a
good balance of traffic in the two directions were not appropriate for routes
with large imbalances. Also, the mixture of class of commodities determined
the earning potentials of the routes. Hence, routes with a high proportion of
Class A or Class B commodities in the total cargo traffic had higher earning
potentials than routes with a higher proportion of Class C (Basic) com-
modities.19
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Effects on the economy
The flaws in the tariff structure and rate setting created adverse effects on
the economy. In general, the adverse effects fell disproportionately on the
producers and traders of agricultural commodities. The very low rates for
basic commodities limited the availability of appropriate services for
agricultural products. In particular, grain shippers from Mindanao had
difficulty in obtaining sufficient cargo space because the rates were too low5
to make the commodities attractive to operators. In turn, the unavailability
of sufficient liner services, inhibited the growth of inter-island trade and
agricultural diversification; and resulted to high storage costs, commodity
value losses resulting from deterioration and high charges for the alternative
and limited services of trampers and air transport.
On the other hand, since the passage rates were not permitted to increase
with the general inflation rate, they failed to keep pace with the increasing
cost of providing passenger services. The practice in general is for cargo
services to subsidize passenger services. This made profitability in passenger
service difficult to achieve and resulted to both the tendency to overload
and provide very low service standards, which in turn, resulted in some of
the major maritime disasters in the country’s history. It also hindered the
introduction of liner services on new routes as it raised the minimum level
of traffic required to make the service profitable.
Overall, the past regulatory system protected inefficient industry
operation.
5 The rates are lower than those imposed by tramp operators for hauling grains.20
V
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Liberalization, Deregulation and Other
Government Policies
The problems arising from the regulations of the industry and the major
maritime disasters and accidents that claimed thousands of lives towards
the end of the 1980s prompted the government to finally introduce policy
reforms in the industry (PTF 1989). The reforms came through the deregu-
lation of the passage and freight rates and the liberalization of routes. As
discussed below, the process of reform was implemented gradually start-
ing 1989 and is still continuing at present.
The change in policy was meant to introduce and/or enhance the level
of competition in terms of the rates charged and the quality of service
rendered while at the same time to attract new shipping investments by
leveling the playing field for existing and new operators.
Deregulation of liner rates
A summary of the reforms for liner rates is shown in Table 5. Changes in
policies and regulations were first initiated in 1989 under MC No. 46 as a
result of the recommendations of the Presidential Task Force on the Inter-
island Shipping Industry. Early reforms included the (i) abolition of the
charging of ad valorem rates, although a 3/10 percent surcharge of the
declared value of the commodity was imposed, except for Basic commodities;
(ii) reclassification of Basic commodities to Class C (Basic); and (iii)
deregulation of the first and second class passage rates.6  For the latter, a
minimum of 50 percent of vessel capacity should be allocated to Third Class
accommodation.  The deregulation allowed operators to determine the rates
they will charge for their services.
Further reforms were made in 1990 under MC No. 57.  The 3/10 per-
cent surcharge was abolished; hence, all commodities were charged the
corresponding class rates.  Freight rates for refrigerated cargoes, transit
cargoes, and livestock were also deregulated.  A most welcome reform was




























































Table 5. Government regulations on domestic shipping rates.
(i) charging of ad valorem
rates abolished; (ii) Class
Basic reclassified as
Class C (Basic); (iii) 50%
of passenger capacity
allocated for third class
accommodation.
(i) Rates for refrigerated,
transit and livestock
deregulated; (ii) Fork tariff
system used for
determining regulated rates.
(i) Increase in the fork rate
by 12% and 8% for
passage and freight rates,
respectively.
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Note:  The table is a chronological presentation of the EO and MC. The remarks column only include the salient features not included in the preceding circulars, unless
stated as abolished.
EO/MC
& year Title of EO/MC
Passage Rates Freight/Cargo Rates Remarks
First Class Second class Third class Class A Class B Class C Basic/Class
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the introduction of the fork tariff system for the determination of freight
and passage rates.7 Under the system, rates are allowed to fluctuate be-
tween upper and lower limits from a given reference or indicative rate,
thereby providing some flexibility in the determination of rates. For cargoes,
the system provides a mechanism for the shippers and shipping operators to
negotiate for the rates within the band set by the government.  The first fork
tariff system had a lower and upper limit of  –5 percent and +5 percent of the
reference rate, respectively. This means that a domestic shipping operator
may increase its freight rate of a given commodity or shipment up to a maxi-
mum of 5 percent and may deduct a maximum of 5 percent on the base rate.
In 1991 (MC No. 59), the reference rate for the fork tariff system was
increased by 12 percent for the passage rate and by 8 percent for the freight
rate.  In 1992 (MC No. 66), a 6 percent rollback on freight rates was adopted.
Also, the lower and upper limit of the fork tariff system was increased from
+/-5 percent to +10/-15 percent. A mechanism for automatic fuel adjustment
whenever prices of fuel increase or decrease by at least 10 percent was also
instituted. Under the mechanism, however, shipping operators cannot uni-
laterally adjust their rates. Instead, MARINA will automatically adjust
the rates with the issuance of the appropriate Order increasing or decreas-
ing the rates within five working days after the increase/decrease of fuel
price.
The early reforms, however, were unable to correct the problems iden-
tified earlier.  For one, the flexibility provided by the fork tariff system was
very limited as the rates could not vary to the extent that operating costs
vary with respect to routes, ship technology especially with the introduction
of container service and roll-on roll-off (RORO) service, quality of packag-
ing, and changes in cargo handling methods. Second, the compulsory re-
quirement to allocate 50 percent of passenger capacity to accommodate third
class passengers made pure passenger vessel operation less viable. Third,
the reclassification of Basic commodities to Class C (Basic) failed to correct
the insufficiency of appropriate liner service for these commodities. Finally,
the deregulation of the second and first class passenger service did not cause
movement of passengers from third to second class (Nathan and Associates
1991).
Hence, further deregulation was made towards the end of 1992 (MC
No. 67), this time involving the freight rates for Class A and Class B cargoes.
7 Only members of the Conference of Interisland Shipowners and Operators and any other operators who have filed
applications for rate increase by paying the corresponding fee and issued the corresponding Order are authorized to
use the fork tariff system.
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The operators were however required to file their rates for Class A and
Class B and any changes thereafter, with the MARINA. In 1993 (MC No. 80),
Class C (Basic) was abolished and the commodities classified therein were
reclassified as Class C. Fruits and vegetables in ventilated containers were
also deregulated. For passage rates, vessels accredited by the Department
of Tourism as serving tourist areas were exempted from the requirement of
allocating 50 percent of their total passenger capacity to Third Class passen-
gers; and accordingly, their rates were deregulated. However, if the vessel
only has First Class and Second Class passenger accommodation or where
the Third Class passenger accommodation is less than 50 percent of the pas-
senger capacity, the Second Class passage rate was regulated.
Further deregulation of freight rates was made in 1994 through
Executive Order No. (EO) 213, with implementing guidelines under MC No.
117 issued in 1996.  All freight rates were deregulated, except for
noncontainerized basic commodities.  However, for monopolized and
cartelized routes, passage and freight rates continue to be regulated.  The
fork tariff system is still applied to all regulated rates, the upward adjustment
of which continues to follow the revenue deficiency method; but this time,
the rate increase is computed on a per company basis.
The implementation of deregulated freight rates, however, was another
matter as operators were not allowed to determine on their own the rates
they will charge for their services. Instead, the Domestic Shipping Consulta-
tive Councils (DOSCONs), composed of shippers/consumers, operators and
representatives from the government, was instituted to provide a forum for
the process of consultation and negotiations for the implementation of the
deregulated rates or any upward adjustments of the rates. Hence, the de-
regulation as provided for in EO 214 only modified the process of fixing
cargo rates that was previously exercised by the government through quasi-
judicial procedures.
The DOSCON process, however, was abolished in late 1999 when the
implementing guidelines of EO 213 were revised under MC No. 153. Under
the revised guidelines, all an operator needs to do is to file a notice of adop-
tion of deregulated rates with the MARINA, and when qualified, MARINA
will issue an Order within 30 days upon receipt of the notice. The deregu-
lated freight and passage rates should remain in force for at least three months
before any upward adjustment is allowed.
Upward adjustments of deregulated rates can take effect 15 days after
the publication of the notice for increase filed with the MARINA in one daily
newspaper of national circulation and in one daily newspaper of regional
circulation in the port/s affected by the rate adjustment.
For regulated rates, upward adjustment is still based on the revenue
deficiency method.  Under the new policy environment, the method may nolonger be appropriate as the financial statements of shipping companies in-
clude their deregulated operations.
In general, the deregulation of the liner shipping rates has been a slow
process. It took the government more than 10 years to gradually deregulate
the liner rates. Yet, it was only in the year 2000 that government intervention
in rate setting was lessened. With deregulation, the shipping companies can
now consider the traffic imbalances and cargo mixes in setting the rates for
the routes they serve. While there are still areas that remain regulated, these
can be overcome and can be strategic areas for modernizing the industry.
For example, shipping companies can upgrade their vessels and facilities and
be accredited with DOT and be exempted from allocating 50 percent of their
passenger capacity to third class and enjoy the deregulated rates. Also, the
exemption of noncontainerized basic commodities from deregulation should
encourage the use of other shipping technology in transporting these com-
modities, like RORO vessels.
Much is still desired, however. The rate for Third Class passenger is yet
to be deregulated.
Route liberalization
Liberalization of the routes was first introduced in 1992. Two general prin-
ciples are observed for the issuance of a CPC. First, the interest of the public
is paramount. That is, the interest of the public shall prevail over the grand-
father rules of the prereform namely, prior applicant, prior operator and
protection of investment. Second, the presumption of public need for a ser-
vice is deemed in favor of the applicant for a CPC while the burden of prov-
ing that there is no need for a proposed service shall be with oppositor/s
who is/are the current authorized operator/s.
Given these principles, routes were opened to entry to at least two op-
erators (MC No. 71 and MC NO. 80 in 1992). Monopolized routes were opened
for entry to additional operators.  Operators in developmental routes, on the
other hand, were accorded protection for their investment for a maximum
period of five years, after which, the route is open to entry to at least one
additional operator. This was a big contrast to the prereform period regula-
tion where an operator in a developmental route is accorded protection of
his investment for an indefinite period, that is, until he has recovered his
investment. This change in rule would definitely encourage the operator to
increase his efficiency for him to be able to recover his investments before
competition from additional operators sets in. Entry of newly-acquired ves-
sels in routes already served by existing franchised operators, including de-
velopmental routes, is also deregulated provided that the entry will intro-
duce innovative, technologically and cost-effective shipping services, among
others.26
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Operators are allowed to withdraw or suspend their operations after
notifying MARINA 15 days prior to such and after informing the public. An
operator, however, forfeits his CPC if he abandons, withdraws, or suspends
his operation for four months without notifying MARINA. Increase in capac-
ity is also allowed through replacement with a bigger vessel, introduction of
additional vessels and/or increase in frequency of service of existing vessels.
An operator can also change his routing pattern through the omission of
ports, addition of one or more ports, or the introduction of an entirely new
route provided however that the change does not pose any conflict with the
schedule and frequency of service of existing operators and that no route is
left unserved by the rerouting.
The initial liberalization efforts were further strengthened with the is-
suance of EO 185 in 1994 and its corresponding implementing rules and regu-
lations under MC 106 in 1995. In particular, all routes that have been serviced
by any operator for an aggregate period of at least five years shall be open
for entry to additional operators.  Likewise, any operator who pioneers in
the provision of a certain technological level of shipping service in a develop-
mental route is allowed to charge market-accepted freight and passage rates
different from the fork rates. The adoption of such rates after five years,
however, is dependent on the evaluation of MARINA. Also, when capacity is
increased through the replacement of a vessel, the CPC of the vessel to be
replaced is revoked. The revocation of CPC will ensure that the vessel re-
placed will not be used anywhere else and hence, will not result in increase in
tonnage in the routes. Similarly, when capacity is increased through the in-
troduction of additional vessel that is chartered from a franchised operator,
the original franchise of the vessel is revoked. This policy was again a big
contrast to the prereform regulation where the CPCs of vessels replaced were
not revoked.
The implementing guidelines of EO 185 were revised under MC No.
161 in 2000, providing further dimension to the liberalization efforts. In par-
ticular, the conditions or criteria under which possible protection could be
accorded to operators were specified. These include conditions for the exist-
ence of ruinous competition and protection of investment of pioneering op-
erators.  Only under the conditions specified should entry of additional op-
erators to a route be restricted. The conditions set therefore added greater




Foreign shipping lines are not allowed to ply the country’s interisland routes.
Domestic Shipping Modernization Program
To complement the liberalization and deregulation efforts, the government
implemented the Domestic Shipping Modernization Program (DSMP) funded
by a loan package from the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) of
Japan and administered by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
The program has two phases:  Phase I (1995-2000) with a loan package of 14.8
billion yen or roughly P3.91 billion for the modernization of interisland ves-
sels; and Phase II (1999-2005) with a loan package of 19.5 billion yen or P6.7
billion for the development of port facilities in rural areas.
Phase I was used to finance the replacement of vessels (new buildings
and/or second hand), rehabilitation and/or upgrading (bringing to class)
and modernization of interisland fleet; acquisition, rehabilitation, and mod-
ernization of shipyards and port cargo handling equipment; and working
capital. As of June 2001, almost 84 percent of the package has been loaned
out, most of which went to passenger-cargo vessels and tankers (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Loans released by sector, DSMP I,
as of June 2001
Source: IRR, Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
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This explains the increase in the capacity (GRT) of passenger vessels and the
decline in their average age as discussed earlier in Section 2 of the paper.
For Phase II, as of June 2001, a total of P5.8 billion from the loan package
has been released and distributed across the various sectors as shown in
Figure 3.






















5,769.68 Note: Maritime education not included in Phase I
Source: IRR, DBP
Figure 3. Loans released by sector, DSMP II,
as of June 200129
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Market Structure and Competition
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used as an indicator of market
structure. The index is measured as the sum of the squares of the market
shares. It is compared with the ratio 1/n where n is the number of operators
in the industry. The higher the index relative to 1/n, the less competitive the
industry is. The inverse of the index gives the number of equal sized com-
petitors that would provide a degree of competition equivalent to that actu-
ally observed in the market share data. Hence, it is used as a measure of the
number of effective competitors.
The aggregate indicator of market structure for the industry is based
on the primary and secondary routes only, i.e., tertiary routes were excluded
in the computation. Since the tertiary routes involve short distance travel
and hence more frequencies of trips, the total passengers and cargoes plying
these routes would be larger in number compared to the primary and sec-
ondary routes. And since HHI is based on market shares, including them in
the computation would distort the picture.
However, the aggregate indicator of market structure may give very
little insight on the extent of market power in the different routes because
the interisland fleet is distributed across so many different routes. It is pos-
sible that a small operator may capture a large market share in a particular
route by concentrating its fleet in that route while a large operator may not
capture a significant market share if it spreads its fleet across several routes.
Thus, it is important to also examine the market structure by routes. The
routes are classified based on the value of 1/HHI as shown in Table 6.
The study used secondary data and interviews of shipping operators to
analyze market structure and competition in the shipping industry.  Second-
ary data on passenger and cargo traffic by route and shipping company were
gathered using the 1998 annual traffic reports of shipping companies submit-
ted to the MARINA.  This is the latest data that are available and complete.
Much as the study would like to include early years to represent the pre-
reform period so that an analysis on whether or not the policy reforms havePhilippine Domestic Shipping Transport Industry
made an impact on the market structure could be made, the annual reports of
shipping companies were not complete.8 Hence, to get a sense of the impact
of the reforms in the absence of data, interviews were made with four ship-
ping lines based in Metro Manila, six shipping lines based in Cebu, three
shipping associations, and the Distributors Management Association of the
Philippines (DMAP).
Data on passenger traffic were used in measuring the market structure
for the passenger service. For cargo service, since different units of measure-
ment were used for cargo traffic, aggregation was impossible.9 Thus, data on
cargo revenue was used.
Furthermore, since the latest secondary data available is 1998, the analysis
of the study on market structure does not reflect the possible effects of MC
153 and MC 161, which provided further dimension to the government’s
efforts on rate liberalization and route deregulation, respectively.
30
8 The 1993 data were initially processed but the annual reports of some of the shipping companies were missing.
MARINA has data on annual total passenger and cargo traffic but not by route and shipping company which is what is
needed in analyzing market structure and competition.
9 Units of measurements include kg, metric tons, and pieces.
Market structure
Passenger Service
The HHI shows that the domestic shipping industry is highly concentrated
(Table 7). The five largest operators accounted for as much as 90 percent of
Table 6. Classification of routes
Classification Indicator
(1) routes with only one (1) operator
monopoly
(2) routes with at least two (2)
operators
  i. only one (1)effective competitor
 ii. substantial competition
iii. Mild competition
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Table 7. Indicators of market structure, passenger service, 1998
Indicators
Share of top five firms
Share of top three firms
Herfindahl index (HHI)









The five largest players in the passenger service (from largest to small-
est), in descending order, are Negros Navigation Company, WG&A, Sulpicio
Lines, Philippine Fast Ferry Corporation and Cebu Ferries Corporation. One
significant characteristic of these operators is that, three of them are new
competitors, being established only during the reform period. WG&A is a
product of the merger of three shipping giants (William Lines Inc., Carlos A.
Gothong Lines, Inc. and Aboitiz Shipping Corp.) in 1996. Philippine Fast Ferry
(PFFC) is also a product of the merger in 1998 of the Cebu-based Universal
Aboitiz, Inc. and Bacolod-based Sea Angels Ferry Corporation, a subsidiary
of Negros Navigation Company. Cebu Ferries Corporation (CFC) was estab-
lished in 1996 as a subsidiary of WG&A. Both PFFC and CFC had been piv-
otal to the birth of the fast ferry industry in the country. The other two
players (Negros Navigation and Sulpicio Lines) are old time players, being
established long before the reforms were introduced.
            Analysis of the different routes shows that the top five players oper-
ate most of the primary routes (Appendix Table 1). However, there is not
one route where they operate together. On the other hand, the top three
companies operate together in eight routes, all originating from Manila
(Manila-Cagayan de Oro, Manila-Cebu, Manila-Davao, Manila-Dumaguete,
Manila-General Santos, Manila-Iligan, Manila-Iloilo and Manila-Tagbilaran).
About 50 percent of the primary routes have at least two operators and
the remaining 50 percent only have one operator (Table 8 and Appendix
Table 1). Nonetheless, the presence of at least two operators in a route does
not guarantee that competition exists. Of the 26 primary routes with at least
two operators, substantial competition exist only in seven routes or less than
the total passengers. The inverse of HHI shows that out of the 37 opera-
tors plying the primary and secondary routes, less than five are effectively
competing.Philippine Domestic Shipping Transport Industry
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14 percent of the total number of primary routes, while five routes were
effectively monopolized, as there was only one effective competitor. The rest
of the primary routes (27 percent) can be described as having only mild com-
petition. A very good example of this is the Cebu-Bohol route where there
were nine operators plying the said route but less than three were effectively
competing for the passenger market. Another is the Cebu-Dumaguete route
where there were six operators but only three were effectively competing.
For the secondary passenger routes, almost 59 percent was monopo-
lized; 13 percent was characterized by substantial competition; 13 percent
had only mild competition; and 15 percent was effectively dominated by
only one competitor (Table 8 and Appendix Table 2).
On the other hand, monopoly was present in nearly 78 percent of the
tertiary routes (Table 8 and Appendix Table 3).  Operation in about 5 percent
of the routes were effectively dominated by one operator. Substantial com-
petition was found in only 8 percent of the routes.
Cargo Service
Figures on freight revenue also show that the industry is highly concentrated.
The five largest operators together carried 91 percent of the total revenue
(Table 9).  Out of the 66 operators, less than five are effectively competing.
The five largest players in the cargo service, in their order, include
WG&A, Sulpicio Lines, Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, Solid Shipping Cor-
poration and Negros Navigation. Lorenzo Shipping and Solid Shipping are
purely cargo services.
Table 8. State of competition, passenger service, 1998
Route Classification
Primary Secondary Tertiary


































Note: See Appendix Tables 1 to 3 for details.
Routes with only 1 operator
Routes with at least 2 operators
Routes with only 1 effective operator
Routes with substantial competition
Routes with mild competition
Total number of routes33
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Table 9.  Indicators of market structure, cargo service, 1998
Analysis of the routes shows that there are only three routes (Manila-Cagayan,
Manila-Dumaguete and Manila-General Santos) where the top five compa-
nies operate together. Furthermore, close to two-thirds of the primary and
secondary cargo routes had at least two operators but less than 15 percent
experienced substantial competition (Table 10 and Appendix Tables 4 and 5).
On the other hand, a greater majority (76 percent) of the tertiary routes were
still monopolized (Table 10 and Appendix Table 6).
Findings common to passenger and cargo
The dominance of the top five companies in both passenger and cargo ser-
vices, was prevalent in the primary and secondary routes, regardless of the
routes’ state of competition (Table 11). In other words, they effectively con-
trol the market in these routes. Regular monitoring of the routes then be-
comes necessary to ensure that the top five players do not abuse their market
Share of top five firms
Share of top three firms
Herfindahl index (HHI)










Table 10. State of competition cargo service, 1998
Route Classification
Primary Secondary Tertiary


































Note: See Appendix Tables 4 to 6 for details.
Routes with only 1 operator
Routes with at least 2 operators
Routes with only 1 effective operator
Routes with substantial competition
Routes with mild competition
Total number of routesPhilippine Domestic Shipping Transport Industry
power, more so given the fact that the percentage of routes with substantial
competition is relatively small.
Substantial competition is expected in routes common to the top five or
top three players.  It is surprising, however, that this is not the case.  In fact,
there was only mild competition in those routes. Only in the Manila-Dumaguete
34Market Structure and Competition
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passenger route, where the top three companies operated together, was there
substantial competition.
Substantial competition is also expected in the major ports because the
supposed large passenger market and volume of cargoes will draw more
players into the routes. However, the analysis of the routes originating from
Manila or Cebu, two of the countries major ports, shows otherwise. Most of
the routes either have only one operator or are characterized by only mild
competition (Table 12 and Table 13).
A further analysis of the individual routes shows that operators have
their own niche markets. And this is true even for the five largest operators.
A good example of this is Solid Shipping Lines that operates in only three
cargo routes (Manila-Cagayan, Manila-Dumaguete and Manila-General
Santos).  Also, the five largest players are not always the dominant player in
the routes where they operate. An example of this is the Dumaguete-
Zamboanga cargo route that includes WG&A and Sulpicio Lines as operators
but which are not the dominant players.
Analysis of the routes with only one effective competitor or mild com-
petition shows that the dominant player or players get the bulk of the market
while the rest have very small share. The market shares of the dominant
player or players range from 83 percent to almost 100 percent for the routes
with only one effective competitor and from 59 percent to almost 100 percent
for those with mild competition (Table 14). An example is the Cebu-Ormoc
passenger route where there were six operators but 84 percent of the passen-
ger traffic went to only two players. Another is the Cebu-Bohol passenger
route with nine operators but only three operators captured 83 percent of the
market. It is possible that the dominant players offer lower rates or they
have more vessels and larger capacities enabling them to capture a large
segment of the market and leaving the crumbs to the rest who probably have
only small capacities. Pursuing this issue however is beyond the scope of this
paper since it requires an analysis of the cost structures of the individual
operators.
The high concentration in the tertiary routes for both passenger and
cargo services may not really pose a problem since these are usually consid-
ered “thin routes” where traffic is insufficient to attract more than one opera-
tor. That is, only one operator is required to make the operation profitable and
efficient. As discussed in Section 2 of the paper, there is less economic activity
and population in the tertiary routes, implying smaller passenger and cargo
traffic compared to the primary and secondary routes. What is critical, how-
ever, is the close monitoring by MARINA of the services of operators plying
the said routes to make sure that these operators do not abuse their market
power to the detriment of the welfare of passengers and shippers.36
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Source: Appendix Tables 1 to 3.37
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The market power in the passenger service is now constrained by competi-
tion from other modes of transportation. In particular, the deregulation of



























































Source: Appendix Tables 4 to 6.
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Table 14. Range of market shares of dominant players in routes
with only 1 effective competitor and routes with mild competition (%)
passengers. This is particularly true during off peak season when airlines are
able to offer budget fares that come very close to the Third Class passenger
rates of shipping lines. The fast travel by air and the comfort that it provides
more than compensate for the price difference thereby, enabling airlines to
capture a sizeable chunk of the passenger market.
In addition, the budget airfares opened an alternative mode of travel to
a market that formerly cannot afford to travel by air. The best examples of
these are housemaids from the southern part of the country who are work-
ing in Metro Manila or students from the south studying in universities in
Metro Manila. On the other hand, the introduction of fast ferries provides
good competition to airlines flying the secondary and tertiary routes.
Also, the development of roads and other infrastructures (like bridges)
in the southern part of the country opened an alternative to shipping trans-
port. An example of this is the construction of the Marcelo Fernan Bridge
connecting Cebu City and Lapu-lapu City that has reduced the number of
passengers plying the Lapu-lapu-Cebu ferry route because some passengers
now prefer to travel by land considering the reduction in traffic caused by
the construction of the bridge. Also, land transport from Manila to the Visayas
and even to Davao has become increasingly popular to travelers because of
the cheaper bus fare, providing competition to the Manila-Tacloban, Manila-
Catbalogan or Manila-Davao shipping routes.
Nonetheless, market power in the cargo service still lies in the hands of
the shipping industry.
Routes with only one (1) effective
competitor















Source: Appendix Tables 1 to 6Competition
Because of the absence of data, the results of the interviews with shipping
lines and the executive director of the DMAP will be used in analyzing the
effects of the policy reforms on competition. The results of the interview
reveal that the most significant impact of the reforms is the increase in com-
petition in the industry. Given this information and the indicators of market
structure in 1998 discussed in the preceding section, it can be deduced that
the industry was more concentrated prior to 1998. The merger of the ship-
ping giants was initially perceived to be a threat by the other major player.
But since shipping companies operate by maintaining niche markets, the merger
did not make the industry more concentrated nor did it increase the market
power of the merged companies.10 The merger in fact promoted competition.
The merger was the response of the companies involved in increasing their
efficiency as a result of competition.
However, the increase in competition is felt only in the primary and
secondary routes. This confirms the finding in the preceding section that
majority of the tertiary routes are still run by single operators. The increase
in competition in the primary and secondary routes came from additional
operators in the routes. The reforms provided new operators the opportu-
nity to gain entry in routes where entry was previously restricted by the
grandfather rules.
The increase in the number of competitors in the routes is beneficial to
passengers and shippers because it gave them several choices of shipping
lines for the service they require. For shippers, competition did not only
increase choices for their cargoes but it also increased their linkage to their
ports of call. The immediate results of competition are the improvement in
the quality of service.
Quality of service
Because competition  increased, shipping operators were forced to improve
on the quality of their service. Customer service and satisfaction drive up
competition thereby improving efficiency. Improvement in the quality of ser-
vice also meant the introduction of new facilities and amenities on board,
and improvement or upgrading of facilities not only in passenger accommo-
dation but also in ticketing and booking facilities.11 Upgrading of facilities
encouraged certification from ISM and ISO.
Philippine Domestic Shipping Transport Industry
10 The argument is based on the interview with shipping lines. The executive director of the DMAP thinks otherwise.
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Improvement and upgrading of facilities resulted to the modernization
of the domestic fleet. Bigger and better vessels were acquired. As shown
earlier in Table 3, there was an increase in industry fleet particularly for
general cargo and passenger cargo starting 1993. Also, the average age of
vessels for passenger cargo substantially declined from 21 years in 1990 to
less than 10 years in 1999, indicating newer vessels plying the routes (Table 4).
It is also said, however, that the modernization of the domestic fleet
resulted in the overtonnaging of the primary routes during the early stage of
the reform process. Such situation, however, is expected as shipping compa-
nies adjust their operations to the new environment. Likewise, the increase
in capacity during the first half of the 1990s was in anticipation of the ex-
pected increase in passenger and cargo traffic in the future. That is, since
vessel acquisition takes time, vessels deployed today are meant not only to
address present demand  but also future capacity. However, prolonged
overtonnaging could endanger competition.  There is a general observation,
however, that most shipping companies are now reducing their fleet and
consolidating their operations. The reduction in fleet was also partly due to
the fact that the increase in demand for shipping services expected earlier
did not materialize.
Improvement in facilities is best exemplified by the advent of fastcraft
vessels. Dubbed as “a home right at sea,” these fast speed crafts extend the
best of services and the best of convenience enabling passengers to crisscross
islands and regions in a short period of travel. The fast craft vessels opened
a new marketing strategy in the transportation business. Operators of fast
craft vessels have established links with airlines and large shipping lines with
operations originating from Manila, operating in a hub-and-spoke pattern.
That is, the airlines and large shipping lines bring passengers through the
primary routes while the fast craft vessels will bring these same passengers
to their destinations in the secondary routes. Visayas is the hub of the country’s
fastcrafts operation. The strategy has propelled commerce and trade and
accelerated tourism and tourism-related activities in the southern part of the
country.
However, the profitability of the fastcraft industry is observed to be
difficult to sustain.  It is said that fast crafts are not yet appropriate for the
country, considering the country’s level of development. Fastcraft vessels
generally cater to the A-B crowd or those belonging to high-income group of
the society. Domestic sea passengers in the country are mostly the C-D crowd
11 One shipping operator in Cebu has a ticketing and booking office that looks better than the ticketing offices of domestic
airlines.
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or low-income group of the society.  Likewise, fast crafts are good only for
short distance travel; but then again, most passengers in these routes are the
C-D crowd and a few businessmen who travel to places not within the reach
of air transport. It is observed that some of the fast-craft vessels have been
pulled out from some of the routes.
For cargo services, improvement in quality means the availability of
sufficient and appropriate services. The latter was achieved through improve-
ment in technology in cargo services, like the use of RORO vessels and con-
tainerization.12 However, the use of RORO vessels is more appropriate for
the country considering its archipelagic setting. Large benefits can be de-
rived from RORO operations by avoiding handling at two ports as well as
time losses and value losses derived from the time spent at ports. On the
other hand, containerization is more appropriate for long voyages like in
international shipping.
Services in the tertiary routes, on the other hand, remained unimproved
because of the lack, if not absence, of competition. Old vessels and motorized
bancas are still used, endangering the lives of passengers.
Passage and freight rates
Available data on the actual rates charged by two of the major players in the
industry show that rates for both passage and cargo have increased in real
terms (Tables 15 to 18). What is striking however is the large increase in rates
after 1999 compared to the years before it. This is true regardless of the class
of commodity or passenger, except for the first class passenger of WG&A.
As discussed earlier in the paper, the DOSCON process was abolished
in late 1999 allowing companies full freedom to determine their deregulated
rates.  However, the three automatic fuel rate adjustments in 2000 totaling
19.15 percent contributed to the large increase for the period 1999-2000. On
the other hand, the general rate increase of 20 percent adopted by the ship-
ping association in November 2000 contributed to the increase in 2000-2001.
The uniform increase for all shipping operators is alarming as it has a sem-
blance of a cartel-like arrangement.
Nonetheless, the deregulation has corrected what otherwise were very
low cargo rates arising from the past regulatory system. This could be seen
from the large increase (53.3%) in cargo rate of the Manila-Tacloban route in
1999-2000 (Table 14).  Based on the interview, the route is a classic example of
12 Vessels designed to use the RORO method of cargo handling are designed with a ramp at the stern. Over the ramp,
connected to a pier, loaded vans pass aboard, stowing themselves under their own power. On the other hand,
containerization is a method of carrying cargo in vessel container vans stowed on deck or in the cargo hold of a ship.43














































































































































































































Source: Quarterly Report on Actual Rates Charged of Shipping Companies submitted to the
MARINA.
Table 15. Annual increase in cargo rates, Sulpicio Lines (%, 1995 prices)
1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-0144
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Table 17. Annual increase in passenger rate, WG&A (%, 1995 prices)
Routes
1st class suite-super 1st class suite-regular 1st class state-super



















































































1st class state-regular 1st class cabin-super 1st class cabin-regular






















































































2nd class business-super 2nd class business-regular 2nd class tourist-super























































































2nd class tourist-regular 3rd class economy-super 3rd class economy-regular






















































































Source: Quarterly Report on Actual Rates Charged of Shipping Companies submitted to the MARINA.46
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the large imbalance between inbound and outbound cargo traffic. That is,
the ship is full from Manila to Tacloban but not vice-versa. Hence, before
deregulation, the regulated rate for the route did not reflect the cost of pro-
viding the shipping services. Given the abolition of the DOSCON process,
the market could have corrected the rate and contributed to the large in-
crease that occurred in 2000. This argument is strengthened by the fact that
the rate increase in 2000-2001 was already small (9.1%).
It would have been helpful to examine the cargo rates for basic com-
modities as the deregulation of rates for these commodities, when container-
ized, is expected to increase the rates. This is because the regulated rates for
noncontainerized basic commodities were so low that these were unattrac-
tive to shipping operators. However, data on rates for basic commodities are
not available.
Based on interviews with shipping companies, during off-peak season
when there is excess capacity, cut-throat competition leads to “fare diving.”
Some companies go to the extent of cutting their rates to the level that is just
enough to get a break-even income or recover the cost of oil. This is true
even for regulated rates because enforcement is weak. But the worst sce-
nario is when a shipping operator practices fare diving and yet still earns
profits by overloading. This practice adversely affects competition because it
punishes operators who follow regulations. Likewise, overloading puts the
safety of passengers at risk.
Impact of competition
Competition pressures the shipping companies to produce the quality of service
desired by passengers and shippers at the least cost.  In other words, competi-
tion drives them to become efficient. Companies whose quality of service is
poor, whose costs are high or whose profit margins are excessive will lose their
customers to their rivals and eventually be driven out the market.  Thus, only
the efficient ones remain.
This section of the paper examines how competition promotes efficiency in
the industry. Ideally, efficiency would be measured in terms of the costs and
profit margins of companies. However, financial data are difficult to obtain; and
if ever they could be obtained, they may not reflect the true financial operations
as it is accepted that businessmen maintain different books of accounts depend-
ing on what purpose these will be used. Thus, the analysis here deals, not on
efficiency per se, but on the process by which competition promotes the level of
efficiency. This is called the transfer mechanism, defined as the process whereby
output is reallocated from less to more efficient operators (Dick 1987).48
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The indicator used is the turnover of firms that takes into account the entry
and exit of companies arising from competition. Again, only those plying the
primary and secondary routes were considered. The shipping companies are
classified into two: (i) those established before the policy reforms, called the
“old order” companies; and (ii) those established after the policy reforms, called
the “new order” companies. The cut off year is 1992 since the liberalization of
routes occurred towards the end of that year. Also, exit is defined as when an
operator does not operate in any of the routes (primary and secondary) for two
or three consecutive years. Mergers are considered new entrants in the in-
dustry.
There were about 103 shipping companies that operated in the industry
during the period 1990-1998, 76 of which were established before policy reforms
were instituted and 27 were established during the reform period (Table 19). By
the end of 1998, only 37 or 49 percent of the old order companies still existed.
That is, 51 percent are no longer operating, probably due to the stiff competition
brought about by the reforms or they have acquired new names due to merger
or acquisition.
The liberalization of route entry, on the other hand, enabled 27 new
shipping companies to enter the industry during the period 1993-1998. None-
theless, only 16 or 59 percent survived by the end of 1998. In other words, 11
exited the industry, that is, they could have succumbed to competition.
However, despite the high survival rate of the new order companies,
(59 percent as against 49 percent for the old order companies), the surviving
companies are still dominated by the old order companies.  That is, 70 per-
cent of the surviving firms were established before the reforms.  Likewise,
these operators control about 64 percent of the industry’s cargo capacity and
63 percent of passenger capacity.
It is important to note that exit from the industry was highest in 1998
(15 operators) when there was financial crisis. On the other hand, entry was
highest in 1994 (11 operators).
A further analysis of the surviving companies show that 43 percent of
them are growing in their capacity; 34 percent experienced a decline in their
capacity while the remaining 23 percent did not register any change in their
capacity since they were established (Table 20). There was also a redistribu-
tion of capacity from among the surviving companies. The share of the grow-
ing companies increased from 51 percent in 1990 (or when they were estab-
lished) to 86 percent by 1998. Their absolute tonnage in 1998 was 43 percent
higher.  On the other hand, the share of the declining companies went down
from 48 percent to 12 percent.49
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Sources: MARINA Route Inventory
MARINA Vessels with Valid Authority per Link
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If competition is effective, the redistribution of capacity from declining
to growing companies should be accompanied by the redistribution of out-
put from the less efficient to more efficient companies. Unfortunately, whether
this in fact occurred with the surviving companies in 1998 cannot be analyzed
from the data available. It is possible that some of the growing companies
were able to increase their capacities for reasons other than commercial effi-
ciency. On the other hand, it is also possible that companies experience a
decline in capacity not because of commercial pressure but because of marine
loss. This could be an interesting area of further research to ascertain whether
the competition arising from the reforms in fact increases the level of effi-
ciency of the industry.51
VII

The Role of MARINA in a
Deregulated Environment
As presented earlier, MARINA takes charge of regulating the shipping in-
dustry. Created under Presidential Decree No. 474 in 1974, the agency was
mandated, among other things, to provide for the effective supervision, regu-
lation and rationalization of the organizational management, ownership and
operations of all water transport utilities and other maritime enterprises.
Before the reforms were instituted, the agency’s regulatory functions include
the regulation of interisland rates, regulation of entry by granting of route
certificate of public convenience or provisionary authority, and regulation of
safety and service standards.
Under a deregulated and liberalized environment, MARINA should
change the nature of how it regulates the industry so as to create the much
needed competition and contestability in the market. This is crucial since less
competition has been realized, even after implementing policy reforms. In-
stead of just responding to applications for new or expanded shipping ser-
vices, MARINA should be proactive where the unavailability of desirable
services is concerned. It should identify underdeveloped routes or routes
where there is shortage of vessels or routes that are not served and then
facilitate investments for these routes by publicly inviting investors and grant-
ing investment incentives. MARINA should focus on allowing new entrants
in the tertiary routes where there is practically no safe, reliable and adequate
service and where there is rampant overloading of passengers during peak
seasons.
MARINA should also strengthen its developmental functions. Of par-
ticular concern is MARINA’s apparent weak monitoring capabilities. Atten-
tion to this concern becomes all the more important  since, as discussed ear-
lier, only a small percentage of the routes (whether primary, secondary or
tertiary) experience substantial competition and that the top five companies
of the industry dominate the routes, regardless of the routes’ state of compe-
tition. Under the current setup (MC No. 153), MARINA will intervene only if
passengers and shippers file a complaint against the rates and services of52
shipping companies and only if sufficient basis and justification is submitted.
Such regulation should be modified. Monitoring should be on a regular ba-
sis, i.e. not only when complaints are filed, to ensure that the interests of
shippers and passengers are protected against overcharging and poor ser-
vice standards, and that the dominant firm or firms in each route do not
abuse their market power. Regular monitoring would, in the first place, pre-
vent shipping companies from making actions contrary to the regulations.
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Monitoring should be done in tandem with the Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG) that gives the vessels the authority to sail. As discussed earlier, a
shipping operator can resort to fare diving or large discounts and still earn
profits by overloading its passengers. Such practice can be avoided if the
PCG strictly monitors the vessels.
However, for MARINA to be able to exercise its monitoring functions
effectively and for it to be able to identify routes requiring adequate ship-


















































































Note:  Data for nine firms are either incomplete or not
Source: MARINA Route Inventory53
The Role of MARINA in a Deregulated Environment
ping services, a database that is easily accessible to the shipping operators,
investors, researchers, policymakers, and the public in general must be es-
tablished.  Current regulations require shipping companies to submit to the
MARINA quarterly reports of passenger/cargo traffic and the actual rates
charged by their vessels, whether regulated or deregulated. Nonetheless,
such reports remain as reports and are not being processed into a database.13
The database should include, at the very least, passenger/cargo traffic
and freight/passage rates by shipping company and by route; number of
operators per route and vessel capacity per route. The effectiveness of MA-
RINA as an investment facilitator and regulator on a day-to-day basis hinges
much on the availability of this critical information. MARINA therefore needs
to invest on establishing the database and on its computer facilities and hu-
man resources.
MARINA should focus its regulatory power on service standards and
safety regulations to avoid maritime accidents. It should ensure the seawor-
thiness of the vessels (condition of the hull, requirements for navigational/
firefighting/life-saving equipment, manning requirements, etc.) and that ship-
ping operators strictly observe the minimum service standards.
One particular issue confronting the MARINA these days is the basis
for the approval of upward adjustment of regulated rates. The approach cur-
rently used is still the revenue deficiency method. However, the approach is
no longer appropriate as the financial statements of shipping companies in-
clude their deregulated operations.
13 This is based on the experience of the author in making this study.  No data on freight/passage rates or passenger/
cargo traffic by routes and by company are readily available.VIII
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Areas for Competition Policy
and Further Reforms
Competition policy
Liberalization and deregulation should not be undertaken in isolation. The policy
reforms should be complemented by competition policy to ensure that the com-
petition and other benefits arising from liberalization and deregulation are not
eroded by possible development of market power among shipping lines. As
discussed earlier, substantial competition exists in only a small percentage of the
routes and that cartel-like arrangements have been observed to exist in the in-
dustry.
One area for competition policy is on merger and acquisition or consoli-
dation.  Fierce competition can push companies into bankruptcy, merger or
consolidation. The latter can have both positive and negative effects. On the
positive side, efficiency could be enhanced as it allows shipping companies to
consolidate their functions like marketing, ticketing, repair and maintenance,
etc. On the negative side, there is the fear that the end result will be a large
company becoming so dominant that it can exert considerable market power.
The country’s shipping industry has seen merger and consolidation hap-
pening in response to the reforms. The merger did not result to an increase in
market power of the merged companies, at least for now, since the current con-
cern of the companies is more on consolidating their functions and not much on
increasing their market share. The picture could change, however, once the con-
solidation has been completed.
Hence, a policy on merger and consolidation should be defined in such
a way that mergers and consolidation would not result to reduced service
and less competition. The efficiency effects should be weighed against the
market power effects. In short, merger should be in the interests of the trav-
eling public.
Another important area to consider is the development of the tertiary
routes.  The shipping industry has become an important source of competi-
tion for the air transport industry in providing transport services to the
country’s islands in the south (Austria 2000).  The system of providing gov-
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ernment incentives to shipping operators developing the tertiary routes should
therefore be designed in such a way that the efficiency arising from the
intermodal competition will not be distorted.
Further reforms
The government should continue its deregulation efforts. Of particular inter-
est is the regulated rate for non-DOT accredited vessels that either only of-
fers first and second class accommodation or whose third class accommoda-
tion is less than 50 percent of the total passenger capacity. This regulation has
no rationale as the first class and second class passenger services have al-
ready been deregulated.
One important issue remaining for deregulation is the third class pas-
senger service. About 70 percent of passengers take the third class service,
majority of whom also come from the C-D crowd. The regulated rate for this
service is regarded by shipping companies as very low and cannot cover
cost. The operation is therefore cross-subsidized, and often by cargo rev-
enue.  Since most of the cargo rates are already deregulated, passenger-cargo
vessels are placed at a disadvantage against pure cargo vessels because cross-
subsidization is no longer feasible under a deregulated environment. This is
also aggravated by the fact that current regulation requires passenger ves-
sels to allocate 50 percent of their passenger capacity to third class passen-
gers, except for DOT-accredited vessels. Given the sensitivity of the issue
because of its social implications, any attempt to deregulate the third class
passenger service should be carefully looked into. A balance should be struck
between social objectives and economic efficiency.
Two other significant areas for reform are the ceiling on the return on
investment and the application of the revenue deficiency method for upward
adjustment of regulated rates. Both are anticompetitive. The ceiling on ROI
serves as a disincentive for efficient shipping companies because the return
may not be commensurate to the level of service rendered. Based on the
results of the interview, many of the shipping companies  regard shipping as
less profitable than other competing investments. The ceiling on ROI makes
the industry less attractive to investors.
On the other hand, the revenue deficiency method awards inefficient
companies because it guarantees return, regardless of the level of efficiency.
As presented earlier, the method can no longer be applied under the new
environment because the financial statements of companies also include their
deregulated operations.




Regulation has a long history in the country’s shipping industry. This paper
examined the conflicting forces of past government regulations and competi-
tion and their impact on the industry. The restrictive regulations have weak-
ened, if not prevented, competition thereby rendering them ineffective in
achieving the avowed aim of regulatory policy, which is to promote effi-
ciency.
The inefficiency and the consequent adverse impacts on the economy
prompted the government to institute reforms through liberalization and
deregulation in the 1990s.  Competition has improved, undermining industry
practices leading to an improvement in the quality of service. Nonetheless,
substantial competition exists in only a small percentage of the routes. A
greater majority of the routes are still effectively monopolized or experience
only mild competition. The top three or top five companies in the industry
effectively dominate the different routes, regardless of the routes’ state of
competition.  What is more striking is the large increase in cargo and passen-
ger rates after the reforms. The cartel-like arrangement that is observed to
exist in the industry may have contributed to this.
The policy reform has been a slow process and much is still desired.
There is a need for competition policy to ensure that the benefits derived
from liberalization and deregulation will not be eroded by the possible abuse
of market power among the shipping lines. Likewise, the commercial success
or failure of shipping companies in a liberalized and deregulated environ-
ment hinges much on their responsiveness to market requirements; in short,
their competitiveness. However, competitiveness depends on a host of fac-
tors that include shipping costs and physical and administrative in
frastructures. It has always been argued that domestic shipping costs (fuel,
interest rate, insurance, and income and freight taxes) and handling costs in
the country are higher than other countries in the region (Lorenzo 1997; PISA
2001). On the other hand, port facilities in the country are far below world-
class standards, with some ports still undeveloped.57
Summary and Conclusions
Finally, the high domestic shipping cost in the country is causing the
pressure for the lifting of the cabotage law to enable domestic shippers avail
of lower shipping costs from foreign vessels. The lifting of the cabotage law
will expose interisland shipping to the pressures of international competi-
tion. This would be advantageous for the country in the long run as it will
increase the pressure for efficiency among all players in the industry. How-
ever, the government needs to identify what measures and actions must be
undertaken, including their sequencing, during the transition to full liberal-
ization in order to prepare domestic shipping lines against foreign competi-
tion. At the very least, the domestic shipping environment should be im-
proved by addressing the domestic issues (as mentioned above) affecting the
industry’s competitiveness.58
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Appendix Table 1. Dominant/effective players per route per type of market, passenger



































































































Cebu Ferries Corp, Sulpicio Lines
Cebu Ferries Corp, Sulpicio Lines
Company B*, Arrel Shipping,
Victoriano Millanes
WG&A, Sulpicio Lines
Sulpicio Lines, WG&A, Negros
Navigation





































Routes with only 1 operator
Batangas/ Puerto Princesa






















Palawan/ Cagayan de Oro
Palawan/ Davao
Palawan/ General Santos
Routes with at least 2 operators
Routes with substantial competition
Cagayan de Oro/ Jagna

























































































































































Phil Fast Ferry, Negros Navigation,












































Cebu/ Palawan/ Puerto Princesa
Cebu/ Tagbilaran



























Source: 1998 Annual Traffic Reports of Shipping Companies submitted to the MARINA.Philippine Domestic Shipping Transport Industry
60
Appendix Table 2. Dominant/effective players per route per type of market, passenger














































































San Nicolas Lines Inc.
Sulpicio Lines Inc





































Routes with only 1 operator
Batangas/ Romblon

















Manila/ Leyte (Baybay/ Maasin)
Manila/ Mindoro (Tilik)
Manila/ Tacloban















































































































Concepcion Ang, Adelia Membreve
Sulpicio Lines, Cebu Ferries Corp
Cebu Ferries Corp, Sulpicio Lines











Negros Navigation, George and
Peter Lines
Southern Pacific Transport Corp
Phil Fast Ferry Corp, Cebu
Ferries Corp

























Routes with at least 2 operators
Routes with substantial competition
Bohol (Ubay)/ Leyte (Maasin or Bato)































































Source: 1998 Annual Traffic Reports of Shipping Companies submitted to the MARINA.Philippine Domestic Shipping Transport Industry
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Appendix Table 3. Dominant/effective players per route per type of market, passenger









































































































































































Routes with only 1 operator
Bacolod/ Bataan


















































































































































































































































Tripple "S" Divers Services
Tripple "S" Divers Services
Negros Navigation





Tripple "S" Divers Services
Tripple "S" Divers Services
M/ V Intan
Zenaida Petracorta
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San Nicolas Lines Inc.
San Nicolas Lines Inc.



















M/V Lilly/ Dona Antonina/ Dona Anita
Daima Shipping Corp



























































































































































































































































































Santa Rosa Sea Trans, Inc.
Tripple "S" Divers Services
Tripple "S" Divers Services
Tripple "S" Divers Services
Jose Castro
Magnolia Shipping Corp
Tripple "S" Divers Services
Tripple "S" Divers Services












ABC Liner & Ferry Boat Services
Magnolia Shipping Corp





























































Sta Ana/ Isla Rita
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Almyre Cortez, Santiago Regalado
Sulpicio Lines, Cebu Ferries Corp
San Juan Shipping Lines, MY Lines
Jose Pedida, Virgilio Arbolado
Jose Pedida, Virgilio Arbolado
Magnolia Shipping Corp.,
Sampaguita Shipping Corp
Rodolfo Monilla, Juanito Tiu
Miller Santiago, Michael Jude
Placencia
Isidro Refil Jr, Michael Jude
Placencia
Cipriano Buante, Arturo Susas
Glifford Roy, Eladio Olit
Ever Lines, Magnolia Shipping Corp
Magnolia Shipping Corp.,
Sampaguita Shipping Corp
Magnolia Shipping Corp., Ever Lines
Magnolia Shipping Corp.,
Sampaguita Shipping Corp
Magnolia Shipping Corp., Ever Lines
Cesar Radjab, Candido Balunos,
Zosimo Barsarsa, Paquito Osake
Phil Fast Ferry Corp









Gaspar Valera, Bords Transport Corp
































Routes with at least 2 operators

















Paradise Beach/ Caltex Sosa





























































































































Villanueva, Fulgencio Aron, Jerly
Cooper, Avelino del Rosario, Pablo
Villanueva, Dante Elisio, Jorge
Pelayo, Antonio Alcazaren,
Aguinaldo dela Torre, Bobby Cahilig,
Rolando Tapuz, Reynaldo Bantang,
Gertacio Gumboc, Nellie Tamboon
Maria Balena, Santiago Siloterio,
Leonardo Tarrarona, Danny
Guillermo, Nerissa Pelingon,
Agripino Alcoran, Ed Gando,
Visitacion Galotera, Romeo Tigolo,








Max Baat, Matilde Baat
Franco Mabigat






Jesus Parilla, Mario Reta







































Sta Ana/ Sta Cruz

















































Source: 1998 Annual Traffic Reports of Shipping Companies submitted to the MARINA.68








Ocean Express Shipping Corp







William, Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc.
William Michael Shipping Corp.
William Michael Shipping Corp.




William, Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc.
William, Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc.
Sampaguita Shipping Corp.
Via Marine Corporation, Terban
Marine Corp
Terban Marines Corp, Via
Marine Corp
Terban Marines Corp, Via
Marine Corp
Cebu Ferries Corp, Sulpicio Lines
Sulpicio Lines, Lite Shipping
Corp, Cebu Ferries Corp
Sun Lines, Magnolia Shipping
Lines
Sulpicio Lines, WG&A












































































Cebu/ Dumaguete/ Gen Santos
Cebu/ Estancia
Cebu/ Iligan/Cagayan de Oro
Cebu/ Iligan/Iloilo




General Santos/ Cebu/ Dumaguete
Iligan/ Cagayan
Iloilo (Estancia)/ Zamboanga
Iloilo/ Puerto Princesa/ Palawan
Manila/ Batangas
Manila/ Cebu/ Iligan







Routes with at least 2 operators























































































































Phil Fast Ferry Corp
WG&A Philippines Inc
George and Peter Lines
Negros Navigation
Sulpicio Lines
Cebu Ferries Corp, Triton
Shipping Corp
Ormoc Enterprises, Lite Shipping
Corp, Nelson Uy, Manolito Abapo
Cebu Ferries Corp, Sulpicio Lines
Sulpicio Lines, Lorenzo
Shipping Corp
Phil Fast Ferry Corp, George and
Peter Lines




Victan Transport Services, Negros
Navigation, Cebu Ferries Corp
George and Peter Lines, Sulpicio
Lines, Lite Shipping Corp
WG&A Philippines Inc
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WG&A, Solid Shipping Lines,
Lorenzo Shipping Corp
WG&A, Sulpicio Lines
WG&A, Negros Navigation, Lorenzo
Shipping Corp, Sulpicio Lines
Negros Navigation, WG&A
WG&A, Negros Navigation
Sulpicio Lines, WG&A, Lorenzo
Shipping Corp















































































George and Peter Lines
Cokaliong Shipping Lines
Sulpicio Lines










Age Shipping Lines, VG
Shipping Lines
WG&A, Sulpicio Lines








George and Peter Lines




























































































Routes with at least 2 operators
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Angelina Balansag, Santos Cruz
Negros Navigation, Lilygene
Shipping Lines
Cebu Ferries Corp, Sulpicio Lines
Cokaliong Lines, Sulpicio Lines




George and Peter Lines
Teng Tick Hua, Magnolia Shipping
Corp, WG&A
Negros Navigation, West Visayas
Shipping Co., WG&A
WG&A, Sulpicio Lines, Lorenzo
Shipping Corp
WG&A Phil. Inc, Sulpicio Lines
WG&A Phil. Inc, Negros Navigation
WG&A Phil. Inc, Sulpicio Lines
Domingo Paredes




































Routes with mild competition































































































William Michael Shipping Corp.
La Felicidad Marine Corporation
La Felicidad Marine Corporation
Terban Marine Corporation
Terban Marine Corporation
La Felicidad Marine Corporation
Terban Marine Corporation
La Felicidad Marine Corporation
Via Marine Corporation
La Felicidad Marine Corporation
William Michael Shipping Corp.
Via Marine Corporation
Super Diamond Shipping Lines, Inc
Via Marine Corporation
Via Marine Corporation























































































Routes with only 1 operator
Adecar/ Panabo






















Batangas (PSPC) / Batangas (CTX)
Batangas (Shell)/ Batangas (Caltex)
Batangas/ Amlan
Batangas/ Cimlong (BTGS)
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Cesar Datinguinod
Via Marine Corporation








Ocean Express Shipping Corp












Ocean Express Shipping Corp














Ocean Express Shipping Corp
Sulpicio Lines Inc.
Triton Shipping Corporation








































































































Bohol (Ubay)/ San Fernando
Bohol (Ubay)/ Talibon
BRC/ Navotas














Cagayan de Oro/ Bantayan
Cagayan de Oro/ Catbalogan
Cagayan de Oro/ Dadiangas
Cagayan de Oro/ Mindoro
Cagayan de Oro/ Mindoro (San Jose)
Cagayan de Oro/ Ozamis
Cagayan de Oro/ Pasacao
Cagayan de Oro/ Polloc


































































































































































William Michael Shipping Corp.
Eastern Pacific Lines
Lapu-Lapu Shipping Lines




































































































Cagayan de Oro/ San Carlos
Cagayan de Oro/ San Jose
Cagayan de Oro/ Toledo































Cebu/ Bilangbilangan East & West
Cebu/ Borongan
Cebu/ Bulan

















































































































































George and Peter Lines
Palacio Shipping Inc.




















George and Peter Lines
Galactic Shipping Inc.
Terban Marine Corporation





































































































































































































































































































George and Peter Lines
George and Peter Lines
Palacio Shipping Inc.
George and Peter Lines
Cebu Ferries Corporation
Sulpicio Lines Inc.




George and Peter Lines
Milton Ian
Uni-Orient Pearl Ventures Inc.
William, Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc.
Eugenio Chan
Galactic Shipping Inc.










William Michael Shipping Corp.
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William Michael Shipping Corp.
William Michael Shipping Corp.
William Michael Shipping Corp.
Sulpicio Lines Inc.
Sulpicio Lines Inc.
William Michael Shipping Corp.
William Michael Shipping Corp.
George and Peter Lines
Hosanna Shipping
William Michael Shipping Corp.
William Michael Shipping Corp.
William Michael Shipping Corp.
William Michael Shipping Corp.
William Michael Shipping Corp.
William Michael Shipping Corp.
Hosanna Shipping
William Michael Shipping Corp.




































































































































































































































































































































William Michael Shipping Corp.
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Sulpicio Lines Inc.
San Nicolas Lines Inc.
Palacio Shipping Inc.
San Nicolas Lines Inc.














William Michael Shipping Corp.
Terban Marine Corporation
Manuel Perez











RP Tamula and Sons
RP Tamula and Sons
Magnolia Shipping Corporation
Magnolia Shipping Corporation
Ocean Express Shipping Corp
Sulpicio Lines Inc.
William, Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc.
Emma Maglente
Vito Coronacion
William, Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc.













































































































































































































































































Ocean Express Shipping Corp






























William Michael Shipping Corp.
Via Marine Corporation
Via Marine Corporation






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































William Michael Shipping Corp.
Lite Shipping Corporation
Hadji Jalleh Jayyari








Terban Marine Corp, La Felicidad
Marine Corp
WG&A, Palacio Shipping Lines,
Negros Navigation
Philip Go, Lite Shipping Corp
Almyre Cortes, Santiago Regalado








































































Tampi, San Jose/ Ayungon,
     Negros Oriental
Tampi, San Jose/ Bato, Samboan,
     Cebu
Tampi, San Jose/ Lazi, Siquijor
Tampi, San Jose/ Tan-awan, Oslob,









     del Sur/Norte














Routes with at least 2 operators
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La Felicidad Marine Corp
 Terban Marine  Corp
La Felicidad Marine Corp
 Terban Marine  Corp
La Felicidad Marine Corp,
Terban Marine  Corp
Terban Marine Corp, La Felicidad
Marine Corp
Sulpicio Lines, Cebu Ferries Corp
Ocean Express, Jones Carrier
Eastern Pacific Lines, Cebu Ferries
Corp, Lorenzo Shipping Corp,
Sulpicio Lines
Galactic Shipping, Cebu Ferries
Corp, Lorenzo Shipping Corp
Lite Shipping Corp, Conrado
Geraldoy
Cebu Ferries Corp, Phil Fast Ferry
Corp, Palacio Shipping Inc
Palacio Shipping Lines, Ever Lines,
Sultan Shipping
Sulpicio Lines, Lorenzo Shipping
Corp, Cebu Ferries Corp
Jose Pedida, Virgilio Arbolado
Francisco Alboroto, Dominga
Ligoyligoy, Aurelio Leong
Eduardo Jarque, Jones Carrier
Neva Quezon, Escolastico
Geonanga
Jose Pedida, Virgilio Arbolado
HBT Shipping Corp, Lorenzo
Shipping Corp
Miller Santiago, Michael Jude
Placencia




HBT Shipping Corp, V- Lines
Ocean Express Shipping Corp,
Ever Lines Inc
Aquilina Guro, V- Lines



























































Cagayan de Oro/ Bataan
Cagayan de Oro/ Davao


































































































Lina Riega, Cesar Borja
Eduardo Jarque, Jones Carrier
Leonardo Dauhog, Pedro Felizarta
V- Lines, Lite Shipping Corp



























































































































Routes with only 1 effective competitor







Cagayan de Oro/ Butuan
Cagayan de Oro/ Cotabato
Cagayan de Oro/ Ormoc












































































































































La Felicidad Marine Corp
WG&A Philippines
Abdusakar Tan





WG&A Philippines, Rover Shipping
Services, William Michael Shipping
Corp
Jaime Geraldoy, Eva Norono
Palacio Shipping, WG&A, Lite
Shipping Corp
La Felicidad Marine Corp
Dionisio Albania
La Felicidad Marine Corp
La Felicidad Marine Corp,
Terban Marine Corp
Dominador Taglorin, Felix Rabasto,
Charlito Villanueva, Dioneto
Villanueva
Eduardo Donan, Rodolfo Monilla,
Edilberto Bajao
Lorenzo Shipping Corp
Cebu Ferries Corp, Phil Fast
Ferry Corp
Cebu Ferrries Corp, Sulpicio Lines
Cebu Ferries Corp, Sulpicio Lines













































































































































































































Hosanna Shipping Corp, Palacio
Shipping Inc
MY Lines, San Juan Shipping Lines
William Michael Shipping Corp,
Cebu Ferries Corp
Cebu Ferries Corp, Lorenzo
Shipping, Palacio Shipping Inc
Jones Carrier, WG&A Philippines
Cebu Ferries Corp, George and
Peter Lines, Ever Lines
Mabjunnix Shipping, Cesar
Sumalpong
Philip Go, Lite Shipping






SKMMOOA, Maria Balena, Santiago
Siloterio, Anacleto Galabo, Anita
Galve, Ruthelo Geonanga, Eduardo
Gando, Nelia Canon, Fernando
Espinosa, Nerissa Pelingon
Romeo Geraldoy
WG&A Philippines, Sulpicio Lines
WG&A Philippines, Sulpicio Lines




Erwin Tan, Sampaguita Shipping
Lines, Hadji Tan, Radzma Burahan,
Anton Burahan, Hadji Daud
Liwanag Mendoza
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Erlinda Atianzar, Andrea Vargas,
Caesar Playda, Alejandro Requina,
Jesus Basarten, Flaviano Cuenca
Jesus Plarilla, Diana Barail
Marites Pielaga
Jones Carrier, Eduardo Jarque
Jones Carrier
Cebu Ferries Corp, Hosanna
Shipping
Sulpicio Lines, William Chiong
Alibasa Alih, Jovito Chiong,
George Tan
Sampaguita Shipping Corp




Hadji Mubin Daud, Magnolia
Shipping Corp
Jasper Askalani, Lino Lao,
Jainal Tiking





































Sta Ana/ Sta Cruz
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